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INTRODUCTION 
 
Anti-social behaviour orders … will assist considerably in tackling disorder 
and anti-social behaviour. … Much more can and will be achieved, thus 
producing a better quality of life for our communities.
2
  
 
 There have been growing concerns in recent years about anti-social behaviour, 
disorder and its damaging effects on communities: in the period 1995/6 to 1997/8, for 
example, calls to the police for offences such offences increased by 19%.
3
 It has become 
a commonplace problem with a devastating impact on the lives of a large number of 
ordinary, law-abiding people: a reality that was to become increasingly recognised by 
the „New‟ Labour Party while in opposition and latterly in government. Their legislative 
response, The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (hereinafter, CDA 1998) introduced a 
number of measures to protect the most vulnerable people from the intimidating 
behaviour of the few in their midst.
4
 Section 1 makes provision for Anti-social 
Behaviour Orders (hereinafter, ASBOs); a community based civil response to any 
individuals over the age of 10 who acts in any way that causes „harassment, alarm or 
distress‟.  Prohibitions considered necessary to protect the community from further 
behaviour of the same kind are contained in the orders. Activities that can lead to the 
obtaining and enforcement of an ASB0 may not necessarily amount to „criminal‟ 
behaviour but significantly it is a criminal offence to breach the order and this can result 
in a maximum jail term of five years. 
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 It is now widely acknowledged as part of the influential communitarian socio-
political agenda that emerged in the 1980s in the USA that while individuals have rights 
in the traditional liberal sense they also have social responsibilities to the whole 
community for which they can be legitimately held accountable.
5
 ASBOs were 
introduced by a „New‟ Labour government strongly influenced by the communitarian 
agenda
6
 and its dominant theme that autonomous selves do not live in isolation, but are 
shaped by the values and culture of communities. From this perspective it has become 
necessary to take measures to protect and enhance the community against the interests 
of normless, self-centred atomistic invariably actively anti-social individuals. The 
question this paper considers is whether that communitarian protectionism has been 
sought at the expense of individual rights. The paper has the following structure. First, 
there is an examination of the issue of anti-social behaviour and the case for a legitimate 
legislative response. Second, the nature of that legislative response is introduced and 
discussed. Third, a case study of how that legislation has been interpreted and 
implemented by one local authority is presented. Fourth, there is a discussion of the 
implementation of that legislative response in the context of debates about the 
protection of individual human rights. 
 
ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 
 
Disorderly, anti-social behaviour causes alarm and distress, heightens fear 
of crime and if unchecked can lead to escalating criminal behaviour.
7
 
 
 Anti-social behaviour is difficult to define. Behaviour that one person finds anti-
social may to another appear commonplace and tolerable. Moreover, the types of 
behaviour that the public cite worthy of intervention range from the criminal (e.g. 
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prostitution or damage to property) to sub-criminal (e.g. verbal abuse or noise).
8
 
Research has found that police forces do not have a formal definition of anti-social 
behaviour, but at a local level, it was described as, „whatever “minor” problems intrude 
on the daily life of the communities and leads to calls for police service‟.9 The CDA 
1998 (s.1 [1] a) defines anti-social behaviour as that acting „in a manner that caused or 
was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same 
household as [the defendant]‟.  
 The Policy Action Team (hereinafter, PAT 8) of the Social Exclusion Unit at the 
Home Office conducted an extensive study of anti-social behaviour throughout the UK 
and reached the following conclusions. First, the problem is more prevalent in deprived 
neighbourhoods. Second, if left unchecked such activities can lead to neighbourhood 
decline. Third, increases in neighbourhood decline greatly heighten the fear of crime. 
Four, these problems are invariably exacerbated by issues of social exclusion and 
deprivation.
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 There is a clear theoretical link here with the influential „broken windows 
theory‟ developed by the US criminologists Wilson and Kelling who have influentially 
observed that „at the community level, disorder and crime are usually inextricably 
linked. … If a window is broken and is left unrepaired, all of the rest of the windows 
will soon be broken‟.11 Such untended damage signals that no one cares; there is a 
breakdown of community controls, an increase in the level of disorder, this becomes 
perceived as a rise in crime, and there is a threat to „social order by creating fear of 
criminogenic conditions‟.12 In order to arrest and reverse such a „spiral of decline‟ it is 
proposed that the police should pursue a „problem-oriented‟ approach, identify local 
public problems, decide on an appropriate level of order and then provide informal rules 
to maintain what contentiously is considered to be an acceptable level in terms of the 
„community‟s own moral order‟.  
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 The research evidence, which seeks to establish a causal link between disorder and 
serious crime, is ambiguous. The 1998 British Crime Survey (BCS) established a 
correlation between areas of high physical disorder and crime victimisation. For 
example, burglary victimisation was much higher in areas of high disorder than areas of 
low disorder.
13
 Evidence given to PAT8 suggests a link between anti-social behaviour, 
neighbourhood decline, disorder and the creation of an environment in which serious 
crime could thrive.
14
 In an extensive survey conducted in forty urban residential 
neighbourhoods in the USA, Skogan found that regardless of ethnicity, class or other 
variables, residents within the same neighbourhood were in general agreement as to 
what constitutes disorder and the extent of the problem in their locality. That disorder 
was moreover perceived as having played a central role in neighbourhood decline with 
there being a direct link between disorder and crime. Thus, the fear of disorder was 
considered rational because it did seem to precede or accompany serious crime and 
urban decay.
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 Kelling and Coles found that when graffiti and the „homeless‟ were 
challenged on the New York subway system there were dramatic reductions in murder 
in both the subway and the street.
16
 Other researchers have found strong links between 
anti-social behaviour in childhood and involvement in future criminal behaviour.
17
 
 Clear links have been found between disorder, anti-social behaviour and the fear of 
crime. The 1994 BCS indicated that respondent perceptions of disorder - for example, 
noisy neighbours, alcohol and drug misuse - were predictive of concerns about more 
serious crimes such as mugging and burglary and this fear was independent of the actual 
level of crime.
18
 The Audit Commission (1999) also ascertained that fear of crime is 
greatest in areas of high physical disorder.
19
  Kelling and Coles found that police foot 
patrols can have an effect on disorder and anti-social behaviour and that this can reduce 
the fear of crime.
20
 
5 
 The „broken windows‟ philosophy has been closely linked with „zero tolerance‟ 
policing strategies first introduced in New York City in 1993 and various localities in 
the UK in subsequent years that have targeted „quality of life‟ problems such as graffiti 
and low level disorder.
21
 These have been widely criticised however for being 
„discriminatory initiatives, which target and criminalise economically excluded groups 
living on the streets‟.22 However, in Leicester, in the UK, for example, the local 
constabulary eschewed zero tolerance-style strategies in the policing of begging and 
vagrancy in favour of a „problem-oriented‟ approach that sought a balance between 
maintaining order and providing protection for beggars.
23
 
 Some have argued that order-maintenance and zero tolerance policing strategies are 
compatible, that in order to establish the foundations of a successful problem oriented 
initiative it is first necessary to target anti-social elements.
24
 Others consider the styles 
very different. Chief Constable of Thames Valley, Charles Pollard argues that order 
maintenance is essentially about „identifying and describing a complex problem - with 
some broad ideas about how to solve that problem‟. Zero tolerance is simply concerned 
with solutions, that is, to tackle low-level crime and disorder „through aggressive, 
uncompromising law enforcement‟.25 Order maintenance policing suggests a wider 
range of tactics incorporating various local agencies, the community and solutions to the 
underlying causes of problems rather than merely the symptoms. Moreover, zero 
tolerance initiatives are invariably selective in „targeting and criminalising the deprived 
and disadvantaged, the sad and mad, in order to protect business and commercial 
interests. It is simply unfair‟.26 ASBOs appear to focus on the same target with similar 
implications, a drift towards further intolerance of a marginal group with harsh crime 
control methods. 
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 Anti-social behaviour and disorder may be a problem at a local level but in order for 
us to explain these issues adequately, it is necessary to situate them within the context of 
recent socio-economic change. The majority of the population now participates in 
unprecedented levels of consumption, the „driving force of action‟ that has replaced 
industrial discipline as a motivational force.
27
 At the other end of the scale, there is a 
substantial and growing rump - or underclass - that are permanently excluded, a whole 
class of people „with quasi-criminal, anti-social, anti-work cultures of welfare 
dependency, who now threaten the happy security and ordered stability of wider 
society‟.28 For some the underclass is simply synonymous with a dangerous population 
of socially excluded young people invariably concentrated in particular local authority 
housing estates characterised by high crime rates and lawlessness.
29
 This all came to be 
recognised by the Labour Party in political opposition and they subsequently published 
two documents proposing a new-style response to anti-social behaviour - the 
introduction of a „Community Safety Order‟ (CSO) - with a strong emphasis on 
mediation between miscreant and community.
30
 These documents received widespread 
support from the public, police and local authorities for such an initiative for it was now 
widely acknowledged that such behaviour: „causes distress and misery to innocent, law-
abiding people … has reached unacceptable levels, and revealed a serious gap in the 
ability of the authorities to tackle this social menace‟.31 The legislative response 
contained in the CDA 1998 indicated a much tougher stance with no mention of 
mediation. 
 
THE ETHOS OF THE CRIME AND DISORDER ACT 1998 
 
The Crime and Disorder Act provides the framework for a radical new 
empowerment of local people in the fight against crime and disorder. It 
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gives local authorities, the police and a variety of their key partners specific 
new responsibilities for the prevention of crime and disorder.
32
 
 
 In response to a perceived public demand throughout the first half of the 1990s for 
tough action against crime, „New‟ Labour felt they needed to steal the mantle of „law 
and order‟ from the Conservatives. The run up to the General Election of 1997 
witnessed the two parties outbidding each other in making commitments to crackdown 
on crime and social disorder. The Labour Manifesto criticised the Conservative 
Government for forgetting the „order‟ in „law and order‟ and promised to „tackle the 
unacceptable level of anti-social behaviour and crime on our streets‟ by being „tough on 
crime, tough on the causes of crime‟.33  
 
Aims and Objectives of New Labour Criminal Justice Policy 
New Labour criminal justice policy has been fundamentally influenced by left realist 
criminology. This claims to take crime seriously – particularly, predatory street crime – 
and prioritises crime committed by working class people against other working class 
people.
34
 It is recognised that crime is a reality that makes the lives of many people a 
misery and that this is particularly true of local authority housing developments and the 
inner cities; the neighbourhoods that many of the solutions included in the CDA 1998 
were expected to target.  
 Left realists also argue for reduced central state intervention and its replacement by 
localised multi-agency based forms of crime prevention and control. Thus, in this 
context the CDA 1998 gives local authorities and the police a statutory duty to work 
together in partnership to produce a „community safety strategy‟.35 They were provided 
with tools to tackle behaviour previously not deemed criminal and not covered by 
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existing legislation but which posed a threat to the stability and order of communities. 
ASBOs were such a tool. 
 New Labour‟s criminal justice policy has been termed ‟managerialist penology‟ 
whereby a „permanently dangerous segment of the population (the underclass of 
permanently excluded, irredeemably dysfunctional deviants) are managed‟.36 It can be 
considered in terms of the concept of „actuarial justice‟ that removes notions of 
individual need, diagnosis and rehabilitation from the analytical equation and replaces 
them with „actuarial techniques‟ of classification, risk assessment and resource 
management.
37
 The „underclass‟ - and in particular the young underclass - are groups 
identified in this model as being high risk. The Audit Commission report on youth 
offending was framed in this language and ignored the traditional criminological agenda 
of locating the causes of offending by seeking to identify risk conditions, for example, 
lack of parental supervision or truancy.
38
 These factors have all been incorporated into 
the provisions contained in the CDA 1998. 
 
Provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
The CDA 1998 demonstrated New Labour commitment to tackle crime and disorder. 
Young people were identified as being central to the problem and the thrust of reform 
was earlier intervention in their lives. A host of non-criminal orders that proactively 
seek to prevent offending were introduced but which could be enforced by criminal 
sanction. It was proposed that „taken together these measures will provide the victims of 
serious disorder with new, effective weapons to deter those who seem to take delight in 
making the lives of others a misery‟.39 They certainly seemed to uphold Labour‟s 
promise to put the „order‟ back in „law and order‟. 
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 Fionda nonetheless argues that the legislation and the discussions preceding it reflect 
a mixture of conflicting aims and ideologies: punishment, welfare, restorative justice, 
managerialist issues and a „responsibilisation strategy‟ (where central control is rigidly 
maintained while active responsibility is delegated to the local level). This she argues 
has resulted in legislation „that is ambiguous in terms of what it is try to achieve and 
which sends out no clear message about New Labour‟s commitment to any political 
ideology on the subject‟.40 Brownlee criticises the ethos of the legislation for blaming 
the problem of „crime and disorder‟ on a particular group in society and hoping to 
reduce that threat merely through management while ignoring the wider social origins 
of anti-social and criminal behaviour.
41
 Its critics thus propose that New Labour has 
selectively borrowed from left realism to justify a tough approach to crime without 
effective action to rectify the causes of that crime. 
 
The Theoretical Context of Anti-Social Behaviour Orders 
 The ASBO was just one of a plethora of powers introduced by the CDA 1998 to help 
communities bighted by anti-social behaviour. Existing legislation had been seen to be 
inadequate to the task: the police were hampered by the rules of criminal evidence whilst the 
civil courts provided only lengthy and costly procedures for local authorities and housing 
associations to pursue. ASBOs would provide a solution. They are a civil action available to both 
police and local authorities requiring only the civil burden of proof „on a balance of 
probabilities‟.42  Essentially, they are an attempt to control the threatening and disruptive anti-
social behaviour that plagues many neighbourhoods and which puts them at risk of a decline into 
more serious criminal activity. The emphasis is therefore – in accordance with the concept of 
actuarialism - on the reduction of risk and hence the prevention of crime. 
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 The primary rationale for the ASBO is the protection of the public. Thus, the duration of an 
order is not reflective of the offence committed (proportionality) but a period deemed necessary 
to protect the community (with a two year minimum period available). This is again consistent 
with the actuarial model where the length of sentence given is not dependent on the crime 
committed but on the extent of the risk posed by the offender and is therefore contrary to the 
„just deserts‟ principle of proportionality.43 
 
ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR ORDERS: A CASE STUDY 
 
They‟ve given [us] an extra weapon in [our] armoury and they‟ve given [us] 
an effective tool for solving ongoing problems … in conjunction with the 
local authorities. The police and the local authority are working well 
together.
44
 
 
 In this section, we discuss how ASBOs are supposed to work in theory and then 
consider how these had been used in practice one urban location in the middle of 
England where the local authority had adopted a robust anti-social behaviour strategy 
and had actively promoted the use of ASBOs. 
 
How Anti-Social Behaviour Orders Work: The Theory 
ASBOs are applied for by way of complaint to the Magistrates Court, either by the local 
authority or the police but only after consultation with each other (s.1 [2] CDA 1998). 
They are available against any individual over the age of ten who has acted in a anti-
social manner, that is, caused, or was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to 
one or more persons not of the household (s.1 [1] {a}. Magistrates act in their civil 
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capacity and civil rules of evidence apply: thus, the behaviour need only be proved on a 
balance of probabilities and hearsay evidence is admissible. Where witnesses feel too 
intimidated to give evidence in court Home Office guidance allows for the use of 
professional witnesses.
45
 If the application is successful, the court can make an order 
prohibiting the defendant from behaving in way that had led to the application being 
sought.
46
 Requirements in the order must be negative and must last for a minimum of 
two years. 
 Breach of the order is an arrestable offence.
47
 The CPS will conduct the prosecution 
in a criminal court and evidence of the breach must be of the criminal standard, that is, 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Cases are triable either way. If heard on indictment in the 
Crown Court the maximum penalty available at the discretion of the judge is 
imprisonment for five years, or a fine, or both.
48
 The defendant may use the defence of 
„reasonable excuse‟, thus putting the burden of proof on the prosecution.  
 
How Anti-Social Behaviour Orders Work: The Practice 
At the time this research was conducted in September 2000, there were 140 ASBOs in 
force across the country. The Home Office database was aware of 19 breaches of those 
orders (between 1
st
 April 1999 and 31
st
 June 2000), though the length of sentences is not 
known. 
 While the Government had stressed that juveniles are not the main targets of the 
ASBO
49
 it is readily acknowledged that „in the case of 12-17 year olds … applications 
may be made more routinely‟.50 In practice, it would seem that the orders have been 
mainly used against this group. Three out of the orders granted to the Midlands ASBO 
Team were for juveniles and this appears to be the case nationally.
51
 ASBOs have, 
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therefore, been used essentially as a means of bringing misbehaving youngsters before 
the courts, where previously their conduct would have gone undeterred.
52
  
 The Midlands ASBO Team suggested that orders were more usefully sought for 
juveniles not previously drawn into the criminal justice system because it was their 
intention was to sound a warning without criminalising the individual, to deter both 
future anti-social behaviour and prevent an escalation of current behaviour. It was 
readily acknowledged, however, that some young people are already well immersed in 
the criminal justice system before they reach 17 years of age. The Team cited one of 
their most high profile cases, Darren Roberts (not his real name) as an example. By the 
age of 14, he had been arrested in excess of 100 times and received over 60 convictions 
for offences such as burglary, robbery, harassment, assault and car theft. He was 
labelled a „one-boy crime wave‟ in the local newspaper. The team considered the ASBO 
had come too late for Darren. Almost immediately, he breached the order and he was 
given a 9-month secure training unit order. They had learned a lesson from this initial 
interpretation of the ASBO:  
 
We took somebody that was well into the criminal system, the criminal 
system wasn‟t working, and the ASBO was not going to deter him. … By 
the time Darren was 13 there had been 13 years of damage and a little court 
order isn‟t going to help him.  
 
 ASBOs are useful when targeted at juveniles because they widen the powers of the 
police and the local authorities to deal with a category of person previously outside the 
parameters of available powers. Injunctions are only available for persons of 18 years of 
age and over. The Protection Against Harassment Act 1997 is designed to deal with 
situations where harassment is directed against an individual or family but not against a 
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community or where the behaviour is less than harassment but anti-social. This had 
been the case with Darren Roberts:  
 
He was the only member of the family causing a nuisance, so it was unfair 
to go for possession [eviction from the local authority home]. He was under 
eighteen, so we couldn‟t go for an injunction. 
 
The Team admitted that it is much quicker and easier to get an injunction or use other 
legislation once a young person reaches the age of eighteen. There are however 
significant limitations to such a strategy. First, breach of an injunction is not a criminal 
offence and therefore there is no power of enforcement. Second, they are only available 
for the actual tenant of local authority accommodation who breaches their contract. 
ASBOs overcome these problems but take longer to implement because of the need to 
gather evidence from witnesses and information from other agencies. Third, the police 
have powers under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and the Protection 
Against Harassment Act 1997. Nevertheless, this criminal legislation invariably offers 
only short-term solutions and requires a higher standard of proof. ASBOs were seen to 
offer a long-term solution to problems that fell outside the remit of the criminal law: 
 
If one 14/15 year old was there, every time it happened that is no evidence 
of crime whatsoever. But in terms of nuisance and disorderly behaviour, if 
you can say, this person was making a lot of noise and obviously revelling 
in it … they‟re part of a mob … a part of the anti-social behaviour.  
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 ASBOs had also been found to provide a potential long-term solution to on-street 
prostitution in residential areas. The Team were currently considering applying for 
orders in respect of ten persistent offenders soliciting on the street in the local vice area. 
Hitherto, prostitution had been an issue solely appropriate to the criminal courts. 
However, while the police are able to gather sufficient evidence to arrest the women, the 
criminal penalty is problematically just a fine: 
 
Every week the women go down to the court and dutifully pay their fines, 
they regard it as a tax on their activities, it does not keep them off the 
streets.  
 
 If the Team were successful in getting an ASBO granted against a prostitute she 
could be prohibited from working in the whole local authority area and receive a prison 
sentence if she breached the order. The Criminal Justices Act 1982 s.71 had of course 
removed the power of the courts to hand down a custodial sentence for prostitution. 
 The ASBO is just one of a number of measures available to the police in the case of 
prostitution. It is possible to pursue a criminal line of enquiry and to liase with the CPS 
while an order is being sought, and even after it has been imposed. The CPS would be 
made aware that an ASBO had been made and if breached there would be the possibility 
of a custodial sentence: 
 
So, the CPS is probably going to say it is not in the public‟s interest to 
prosecute. It is not worth the public money because they are going to be 
dealt with more firmly by the ASBO route. … It depends on how serious the 
criminal offence is as to whether they do it solely as criminal, solely as a 
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breach [as in the case of prostitution], or they might think … it‟s worth 
going down both routes. 
 
 The Midland Team were aware of human rights legislation issues but did not foresee 
any substantial difficulties arising: 
 
The alternative is to make them criminal in the first place, … either we 
tolerate anti-social behaviour to some degree or we make that behaviour a 
crime, which ratchets it up a notch and virtually says that any young person 
in high spirits is committing a crime. 
 
 A necessary balancing act between individual and community rights was readily 
acknowledged when considering an application but the team considered themselves 
successful in achieving this: 
 
The Human Rights Act is not a problem because the terms of the order have 
to relate to previous behaviour that‟s going to be proportional. We always 
push the point that ASBOs are community-based orders and members of the 
community have human rights as well. 
 
 But in particular, with regard to concerns about the infringement of the rights of the 
particular individual: 
 
I don‟t think they‟ve got anything to worry about. If they don‟t persist with 
that behaviour then they don‟t need to worry do they? 
16 
 
 The orders were not considered a punishment simply an attempt to improve the 
situation in a given geographical area, while seeking to constrain the behaviour of an 
individual. ASBOs had been introduced with the intention of protecting the rights of 
communities and the Team asserted that this is exactly what they seek to do, 
irrespective of the rights of the individual. In fact, this issue of this balance of rights is 
one of the most intensely debated criticisms of ASBOs. 
 
A BALANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS? 
 
The excess in severity may be useful for society, but that alone should not 
justify the added intrusion into the rights of the person punished.
53
 
 
Getting the balance right 
ASBOs were introduced by a government with a strong commitment to communitarian 
values and the intention of protecting the rights of communities susceptible to 
unacceptable behaviour of individuals or groups in their midst. Nonetheless, the 
interests of the community should reasonably be balanced with those of the individual: 
‟people have a right to be protected against aggression, intimidation and incivilities. At 
the same time, it is necessary to heed the rights and liberties of disadvantaged 
citizens‟.54 
 Seeking a balance between the rights of the individual and those of the community 
was a challenge faced in many US cities during the 1980s and 1990s, as 
communitarianism became an increasingly influential doctrine to the detriment of the 
more traditional individualism.
55
 Seattle, for example, had long tolerated a population of 
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street people. During the 1980s, however, they came increasingly to be associated by 
commercial enterprise with falling revenues; citizens refused to shop in areas in which 
they felt intimidated and compelled to walk in the road to avoid people begging, 
insulting them and openly urinating. City Attorney Sidran responded by issuing a set of 
acceptable behaviour guidelines to the street people. For example, sitting or lying on 
public sidewalks between the hours of 7am and 9pm was prohibited. Opposition came 
from libertarians who categorised the legislation „anti-homeless‟. Sidran explained: 
 
What you get into is some sort of balancing in the hearts and minds of the 
court about whose sidewalk this is. … If street people congregate on 
sidewalks what about those trying to cross the street? Deliver products? 
Furthermore, if citizens … withdrew from the streets the homeless would 
then become victims of predators in their midst.
56
 
 
 The Seattle courts decided that this example of order maintenance did strike a 
balance between the rights of the individual (the homeless) and the community (the 
citizens of Seattle). Had they retained the liberal status quo this would have entailed a 
violation of the rights of the community, and vice versa had the police chosen to take a 
„zero tolerance‟ approach and excluded the homeless altogether. 
 Whether such a balance has been achieved in the British context with the 
introduction of ASBOs has been a matter for extensive discussion, in particular, since 
the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter, ECHR) 
into UK domestic law under the Human Rights Act (hereinafter, HRA) 1998. All 
domestic law would now have to be compatible with the convention. Critics say that the 
CDA 1998 is not. 
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 The ECHR provides private individuals with no obligation to protect the human 
rights of another individual but „the European Court and Commission have chosen to 
impose the obligation on state authorities to protect individuals from the actions of other 
individuals‟.57 Under Article 8 of the Convention – the right to respect for private and 
family life – individuals are guaranteed a right to peaceful enjoyment of their homes. 
Primarily this implies a negative obligation on the state to refrain from arbitrary 
interference of this right. The European Court has, however, extrapolated from this a 
positive obligation to take action to ensure that Article 8 rights are effectively protected 
when the threat is from private individuals. This suggests compatibility with ASBOs, 
which give local authorities the capacity to protect the rights of communities from the 
activities of specific individuals. Interpreted in this way, orders positively protect 
human rights. 
 Others argue, however, that this protection has been achieved at the expense of the 
protections afforded the „offender‟. Lord Goodhart summarises this argument thus: 
 
Human rights are not just the right to behave well. … People have a right to 
be bloody-minded; they have a right within reason to make a bit of a 
nuisance of themselves. … We want to live in a law-abiding society with a 
low level of crime … and a low level of vandalism and disorder of all kinds 
… but, at the same time, we do not want to live in an authoritarian state.58 
 
 Von Hirsch et al argue that ASBOs abandon basic legal protections for defendants 
and thus breach their civil rights.
59
 This human rights critique is founded on three 
fundamental issues. First, ASBOS require only a civil standard of proof to potentially 
enforce criminal measures. Indeed, Home Office guidance states that the orders are 
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intended to deal with criminal or sub-criminal activity, which, for one reason or another, 
cannot be proven, to the criminal standard, or where criminal proceedings are not 
appropriate‟.60 Cracknell argues that this clearly indicates the use of civil law for crime 
control. The order may have a civil rhetoric but the outcome of the procedure, if 
violated, can be severe criminal penalties.
61
 Von Hirsch et al thus observe that the crime 
control nature of civil procedures contradict fundamental due-process protections.
62
 
Packer had argued that a legitimate criminal justice system should incorporate elements 
of both „due-process‟ and „crime control‟ models, a notion of „balancing‟ conflicting 
aims and interests that Ashworth develops observing that they, „should not be driven by 
consequentialist calculations of which set of arrangements would produce the most 
overall benefits to society. Rather, individual rights must be assigned some special 
weight in the balancing process‟.63 
 It is arguable whether the rights of the individual receive sufficient consideration by 
those applying for an ASBO. While opponents argue that the threshold for proof is too 
low, in practice, this might not be the case. The Crown Court has suggested that the 
civil standard of proof is flexible.
64
 Moreover, the rules of evidence state that, „if an 
issue in a civil case involves an allegation that a criminal … act has been committed, the 
standard of proof on that issue must be commensurate with the occasion and 
proportionate to the subject matter‟.65 In practice, the acceptable lower standard of proof 
available was not taken literally by the Midlands ASBO Team: 
 
It‟s hard to say how much [evidence] to need but we tend to go over the top 
because the cases we take to court we like to be strong. 
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 Moreover, on the issue of the use of witnesses and hearsay evidence (civil procedure): 
 
If we haven‟t witnessed [the behaviour] we can serve … a hearsay notice on 
the defendant but the defence can challenge that and if the witness is not 
there to be cross-examined the judge won‟t give that evidence as much 
weight. 
 
 There is a potential argument that the civil rhetoric of ASBOs violates Article 6 of the 
ECHR– the right to a fair trial – by not affording suspects the criminal safeguards to which 
they are entitled. Thus, any proceedings established as „criminal‟ under Article 6(1) would 
require further safeguards afforded them by articles 6(2) and 6(3). The case of Engels vs. 
Netherlands (A22, 1976) established the meaning of „criminal‟ and this is dependent on 
three criteria. The first is whether an offence is classified as a criminal offence under 
domestic law. If this is not the case then the other two criteria become applicable. The 
second is the nature of the offence and the third, the degree of severity of the penalty. 
 Once established as criminal under Article 6(1), it is then it is then necessary to turn to 
Article 6(2) and 6(3). The former concerns the standard of proof, and the ECHR insists that 
guilt should be proved beyond reasonable doubt (this is not the case with the ASBO).
66
 In 
respect of the latter, those subject to applications for ASBOs are never formally arrested or 
advised of their rights, they are not required to be in court for the hearing and they are only 
entitled to legal aid and witness examination on a civil standard.  
 However, the Court of Appeal Judges (Civil) have held that ASBOs cannot be deduced 
as „criminal‟ under Article 6(1) because the application procedure is separate from the 
subsequent criminal proceedings that result from a breach and whose criminal safeguards 
are provided.
67
 Plowden contests the legitimacy of this finding observing the original order 
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to be merely a „preliminary warning stage in a single process‟ in which „further warnings 
are inappropriate, illustrated by the lack of conditional discharges as a penalty upon 
breach‟.68 
 The second fundamental issue raised by human rights critics of ASBOs is the nature of 
restrictions on behaviour that can be included in an order. A wide variety of conduct - for 
example playing music or walking in a city centre – behaviour that is neither a criminal 
violation, nor a civil wrong in itself can be proscribed. This is done to protect the public 
from future risk of harassment. However, these actuarialist principles are in direct 
confrontation to the values of commensurate deserts principles: thus, an order must last a 
minimum of two years, in the hope of reducing risk, regardless of the offence. In 
Manchester, a 15-year-old schoolboy who „terrorised a community with threats of murder 
and fire-bombings‟ was banned from entering a designated square mile of the city for a 
period of ten years.
69
 His behaviour as leader of a gang is certainly worthy of concern and 
a punitive response would seem in order to protect the community. Nonetheless, a ten-
year-long ban on a fifteen year old entering a particular area does appear disproportionate. 
 Thus, the third fundamental issue raised by human rights critics of ASBOs is the 
excessive and disproportionate penalties available on breach. The maximum penalty for 
intentional harassment under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 is just six 
months imprisonment and that requires criminal proof. In the Committee stage of 
discussion of the CDA 1998, Lord Thomas observed that „prison will not make the 
offender truly and earnestly repent and be in love and charity with his neighbour‟.70 If the 
„offender‟ behaves in the proscribed way, not only do they potentially face severe penalties 
but also they carry the stigma „even if he is a person who has otherwise been of completely 
good character‟.71 
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 These issues principally contradict the „balance of proportionality‟ inherent in human 
rights legislation. Any restriction on the rights of an individual should, by characterisation 
of the ECHR, be proportionate to the legitimate aim they pursue.
72
 It seems that the 
combination of civil and criminal law available is confusing and inconsistent and 
defendants are potentially at risk of losing liberties disproportionate to the aim of 
defending the rights of the community.   
 
Widening the net and stigmatisation 
A more general criticism of the CDA 1998 has been the potential for drawing into the 
criminal justice system a group of people who previously would have „avoided‟ it. This 
has been noted as particularly true in respect of juveniles: 
 
[The legislation extends] the concept of „delinquency‟ to behaviour that falls 
short of actual criminal offending. Criminal justice authorities are 
empowered to intervene in these cases of „delinquency‟, thus widening the 
youth justice net.
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Moreover, because of the flexible interpretation of „anti-social behaviour‟ in the 
legislation, „eventually any conduct that displeases neighbours could be deemed “anti-
social conduct”. … The result is to embrace not merely repetitively criminal actors, but 
also those with unconventional lifestyles.
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 The crucial significance is that an ASBO can be obtained without a criminal offence 
having been committed; the behaviour has to be subjectively deemed disruptive and the 
offender considered at risk of their activities developing into something more serious. 
The outcome is that the range of actions over which local authorities can claim authority 
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is widening and individual freedom – particularly in the case of juveniles – is being 
reduced. 
 These observations are resonant with Stanley Cohen‟s „discipline thesis‟ regarding 
the development of the decarceration movement during the 1980s and the transition to 
community sanctions where he argues that an apparently liberal process actually leads 
to „net extension and strengthening. … Intervention comes earlier, it sweeps in more 
deviants, is extended to those not yet formally adjudicated and becomes more 
intensive‟.75 ASBOs can certainly be considered in this way. 
 Cohen considers the role of labelling and stigmatisation in the net-widening process 
and this is again an important issue with ASBOs. Subject to an order, the individual 
may well be labelled: drug addict, prostitute or juvenile delinquent, the formation of a 
label that predominates when describing the individual or the group. It is a process of 
„disintegrative shaming‟76 with the outcome being a community divided into the law-
abiding and a group of outcasts stimulated by their alienation into the formation of 
deviant subcultures. ASBOs can exacerbate the problem because they offer no potential 
to de-label and reintegrate the individual but, on the contrary, the stigmatising process 
will push him or her further and further into a criminal self-concept. In short, targeting 
these groups in an adversarial way will result in certain section of the community 
becoming resentful for being blamed for the „ills of society‟, interpret this as dismissal 
from the mainstream and withdraw from the law completely.
77
 Thus, while ASBOs are 
merely a civil mechanism their potential to „brand‟ people as anti-social is a major 
flaw.
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24 
CONCLUSION 
The „post-modern condition‟ is a term used to describe the increasingly fragmented and 
diverse social world in advanced industrial societies in recent years.
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 In modern 
societies there are different and competing viewpoints or grand explanatory theories that 
explain the world – for example, conservatism, liberalism and socialism – but the 
proponents of each perspective had the moral confidence in their particular doctrine to 
solve all problems in society. In the post-modern condition, politics becomes more 
complex as it becomes necessary to square the diametrically opposite perspectives of 
multiple interest groups with a range of different and legitimate discourses. Moreover, 
„a post-modern politician who aspires to electoral success needs to identify crucial 
political issues that concern the widest possible range of interest groups in order to build 
successful electoral conditions‟.80 
 „New‟ Labour is a political party clearly aware of the need to steer a middle path – or 
„third way‟ – between competing interest groups in contemporary societies. The guru of 
this British version of communitarianism - but with substantial international influence - 
is the Director of the London School of Economics, Anthony Giddens.
81
 The intention 
is to balance the undoubted energy of capitalism with the need to foster social solidarity 
and civic values: „the third way suggests that it is possible to combine social solidarity 
with a dynamic economy, and this is a goal contemporary social democrats should strive 
for‟.82 A crucial identified concern that unites many varied and competing interest 
groups in communal social solidarity is that of crime and disorder. Thus, it was in this 
context that the CDA 1998 was introduced to tackle the „root cause of crime‟ and 
disorder within local communities. ASBOs are intended to protect the rights of citizens 
whose lives are blighted by others who behave in a way previously beyond the reach of 
the criminal law but which nonetheless intrude on the daily life of communities.    
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 Kelling and Coles describe how authorities in various constituencies in the USA 
have introduced strategies to deal with „quality of life‟ issues while invariably being 
challenged in the courts, usually by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and 
other libertarian groups.
83
 Debates surrounding the introduction and implementation of 
ASBOs can be seen as a British example of this conflict between civil rights/human 
rights pressure groups and the „back to justice lobby‟ on the one hand and 
communitarians on the other hand. There have emerged two sets of discourse, each 
worthy of consideration as both individuals and communities have undoubtedly 
legitimate rights. 
 The CDA 1998 communitarian discourse recognises a problem of anti-social 
behaviour in our communities. Indeed, people have a right to be protected against 
harassment, alarm, distress and incivilities and it is fair that the police and local 
authorities should target this behaviour to ensure protection. From that perspective, the 
ASBO is a reasonable measure that has filled a prominent gap in the law. They are not a 
punishment but a deterrent and act to stem behaviour before it reaches a criminal level. 
ASBOs are, however, fraught with problems regarding the civil liberties of individuals. 
Both the procedures and orders themselves have been attacked because they infringe the 
fundamental rights of the perpetrator. Local authorities are able to inflict prohibitory 
conditions without recourse to a criminal court of law and are consequently in conflict 
with fundamental due process protections.  
 This paper has suggested that the balance may have shifted too much in favour of  
„communities‟ at the expense of individual liberty. Moreover, due-process values have 
been sacrificed in the increased pursuit of crime control outcomes with a worrying 
potential to absorb further into a widening net a whole group of relatively non 
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problematic young people who left pretty much alone would grow out of their anti-
social activities and become respectable members of society. 
 So, what does the future hold for ASBOs? One possibility is to hear applications in a 
criminal court so that orders continue in their present form but individuals are afforded 
better safeguards. There are, however, two potential problems with this proposal. First, 
this would amplify the problem of „net-widening‟ by „criminalising‟ an excluded group 
who might not be involved in criminal behaviour. Second, there would be considerable 
resource implications. ASBOs were introduced in their present civil form so that the 
police do not have to spend considerable time gathering criminal evidence, a „quick fix‟ 
was seen to be needed to quell anti-social behaviour before it develops into something 
more serious. If the evidence requirements were increased to the criminal standard then 
local authorities might just as well wait for the behaviour to escalate and use the 
criminal law against the offender. Nothing would be really gained.  
 There is nonetheless a case for revision. Speaking to the Midlands ASBO Team, two 
issues became apparent. First, ASBOs are most useful used against those at an early 
stage in their anti-social/criminal career; and second they are best targeted at those who 
already have behaved in some way that has been proved to a criminal standard, for 
example, in the case of convicted prostitutes. In most of these cases the individuals have 
received criminal penalties but with little deterrent effect. The ASBO reinforces the 
element of deterrence and prohibits the individual only from breaking the law. It is not 
drawing people into the net who are „otherwise law-abiding‟ for they are proven 
lawbreakers. Perhaps, therefore, specific conditions should apply before an order can be 
sought. For example, a perpetrator should have a significant but not substantial criminal 
record - because ASBOs have been shown not to work for people with a long history of 
27 
offending - and they thus should be imposed at an early stage. The standard of proof 
required should be of a „higher civil standard‟. 
 ASBOs have a legitimate and appropriate future in a communitarian criminal justice 
policy. It would be a mistake to abandon or seriously curtail their use because measures 
are needed to tackle a grievous social threat to many communities. It is however 
appropriate to consider and reconsider the issue of civil liberties and human rights in 
terms of their long-term implementation. 
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